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This paper presents new data on telecommunications reform for a cross section of countries. We 
measure telecommunications reform along two dimensions: entry barriers and regulatory 
independence. This data set is combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional 
and political data to analyze the determinants of telecommunications policies. We find that entry 
barriers are positively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist legal 
tradition, but they are unrelated to the partisan ideology of reforming governments. We also find 
that countries with weak protection of investors’ quasi-rents by other means, and countries with a 
larger incumbent are more prone to create independent regulatory agencies, although this last 
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The last years of the 20th century were very rich in reform initiatives in the 
telecommunications sector. Many countries introduced private ownership of the dominant 
operators, liberalized at least some segments of the industry and introduced new regulatory 
authorities. Regulatory reform has many dimensions and takes different forms across countries. 
The objectives of this study are to measure the reform processes, taking into account such 
multi-dimensionality, and to analyze the determinants of reform initiatives. We focus on entry 
barriers (including the degree to which market opening or deregulation policies are asymmetric, 
or biased in favor or against entrants) and the degree of independence (vis-à-vis their 
governments) of regulatory authorities. We present new indices, both for entry barriers and for 
independence, which summarize information on a large number of original variables relevant 
to these policy areas. We recognize that policies are endogenous, and test hypotheses about 
their likely determinants. 
Although there is a broad consensus among scholars and international institutions (such as the 
World Bank, the OECD, the International Telecommunications Union, and the European 
Commission) that opening up the telecommunications sector to competition is both possible 
and beneficial for social welfare, the precise nature of this liberalization process is still open to 
debate. Among the unresolved controversial issues surrounding telecommunications reform, 
there is one that stands out: to what extent should the reform policy favor entrants relative 
to incumbents? In other words, how biased or asymmetric should regulation be in the market-
opening phase? Incumbent operators have huge incumbency advantages in most countries 
and enjoy significant scope economies, since they operate in several segments of the industry.  
 
* Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Sixth Framework Programme. We thank Sandra Jódar 
and Cristina Blanco for excellent research assistance. Support from the “Public Sector Private Sector” research centre 
at IESE Business School is gratefully acknowledged. We appreciate the detailed comments made by Lars-Hendrik 
Röller, Jordi Jaumandreu, Joan Ramon Borrell, Daniel Montolio and Astrid Jung. The paper also benefited from 
discussions at a CEPR Workshop in Madrid, at the International Industrial Organization Conference in Boston, at the 
Helsinki meeting of the International Telecommunications Society, at the EARIE Conference in Porto, at the ISNIE 
Conference in Barcelona, at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and at the Barcelona Workshop on Industrial 
and Public Economics (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona-Universitat de Barcelona). We also appreciate the editor’s 
suggestions and the valuable comments of a referee. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors.   
2 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
However, in most cases they also carry the burden of funding a universal service, and are the 
main providers of infrastructure. Moreover, asymmetric regulation may lead to regulators 
favoring particular competitors rather than more competition, allowing the entry of inefficient 
firms and imposing unnecessary constraints on incumbents. We do not attempt to resolve all 
these issues in this paper. Rather, we provide measurement tools to address them and we also 
provide some initial results on the determinants of policy choice, leaving the impact of those 
policies on performance for further research.
1 Recent reviews of the interaction between 
competition and regulation emphasize the need to study these issues in specific contexts.
2  
As far as independence is concerned, some scholars and international institutions advocate the 
establishment of independent regulators. Indeed, some countries devote a large quantity of 
resources to try to create at least formally independent regulatory agencies, following the advice if 
not the rules of the World Bank, the OECD and the European Union. However, there is less 
discussion of the particular attributes of independent regulators and how to make independence 
sustainable. Moreover, the measurement of the exact degree of independence, in practice, of specific 
regulators is a matter of controversy in many countries, such as those of the European Union. On 
the issue of measurement, we can draw on the academic literature on central bank independence, 
which analyzes the problem using aggregate indices that take into account several dimensions of 
independence.
3 We take a first step in this direction for telecom regulators. It is an important step in 
our view, insofar as most of the previous empirical literature (see for example Wallsten, 2002, and 
Fink at al., 2002) has only measured regulatory independence as a binary dummy variable.  
We provide a methodology to measure entry barriers and regulatory independence. This 
methodology can be used (and extended) in later work by the research community, and it 
provides a ranking of how far countries have gone in lowering entry barriers and separating 
regulation from governments. It provides a map of telecommunications reform. Comparative 
assessment of telecommunications reform is an active area of research.
4 We contribute to this 
growing literature in three ways: 
First, we construct our original indices. Although we analyze telecom reform over two broad 
dimensions, the policy variables and the parameter estimates incorporate the fact that both 
entry barriers and regulatory independence are multi-dimensional phenomena. Second, we 
test hypotheses concerning the determinants of these two dimensions of reform, namely entry  
                                              
1 In Gual and Trillas (2004) we present an earlier version of this paper where we also analyze the impact of policies 
taking into account their endogeneity, without clear cut results. See also Besley and Case (2000), Duso and Roller 
(2003), Beck et al. (2001). 
2 See Armstrong and Sappington (2003 and 2005). These authors claim that even in those cases where competition is 
superior to regulation, we should expect the transition towards competition to be a “long and winding road.” In 
cases where competition is better than regulation it is not at all clear which policies deliver welfare enhancing 
competition in the long run. These authors claim that policies that lower consumer switching costs and entry barriers 
should be preferred over those that favor specific entrants or limit the market share of the incumbents. 
3 For a summary of the literature on central bank independence, see for example Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 
15). For a comparison of central bank independence and regulator independence, including a discussion of the 
empirical literature in both fields, see Levine et al. (2005). 
4 See Ros (2003), Wallsten (2001), Fink et al. (2002), Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), Li et al. (2002), Gutiérrez (2003).  
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barriers and regulator independence.
5 Third, we use a battery of institutional indices
6 to assess 
how the institutional endowment of countries is related to telecommunications reform. 
Our indices give us a ranking of 37 countries in terms of regulatory independence and entry 
barriers
7 in telecommunications. Among our preliminary results, we find that entry barriers are 
positively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but 
are unrelated to the partisan ideology of reforming governments. We also find that countries 
with weak protection of investors’ quasi-rents by other means, and countries with a larger 
incumbent are more prone to create independent regulatory agencies, although this last result is 
statistically weaker. The ability to commit and the institutional endowment turn out to be key 
determinants of reform policies. Interest groups are likely to be an important determinant as 
well, although this result is less robust with our data set.  
A contribution to the literature related to ours is Li et al. (2002), which analyzes privatization 
and liberalization policies separately.
8 The main differences between our paper and theirs are as 
follows: First, we measure and analyze the determinants of regulator independence, while they 
do not. Second, we include privatization as one of the components of the independence 
package (and alternatively, of the entry barriers package) whereas they analyze it separately. 
Third, among the determinants of entry barriers, we examine (and find significant) the impact 
of the judicial tradition of countries and other aspects of the institutional endowment, whereas 
they do not. They have a larger (cross country and over time) sample, but most of their robust 
results are consistent with one of ours: the role of interest groups is a key determinant of 
reforms, although this is not for us one of the most robust results in statistical terms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the specification 
strategy, the hypotheses and the relationship with the existing literature; Section 3 describes the 
data; Section 4 shows and discusses the results obtained with this data set; and we end up with 
some concluding remarks in Section 5. 
Set Up and Hypotheses 
The objective of our exercise is twofold. First, we want to measure entry barriers and regulator 
independence. Second, we want to perform an analysis of the determinants of both reform 
dimensions. Other studies (such as Wallsten, 2001, Ros, 2003, and Gutiérrez, 2003) also provide 
                                              
5 See LaPorta et al. (1999 and 2002), Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), Henisz and Zelner (2000a and b). 
6 Levine et al. (2005), Stern and Cubbin (2003) and Edwards and Waverman (2006) also stress the importance of 
developing indices to measure reform, and especially to measure regulatory independence. These papers provide a 
first assessment of our indices. 
7 Note that our entry indices are an inverse measure of entry barriers. According to our measure, low entry barriers 
can reflect both the elimination of regulatory barriers to entry and cases where regulation actually favors entry. 
8 They claim that interest groups are more successful in more democratic societies, but we do not find their 
arguments and evidence totally convincing. Beyond possible quibbles on measurement issues, they do not discuss the 
possibility that more democratic societies are correlated with those with stronger financial sectors and with 
the development, not the efficacy, of pro-reform interest groups. Indeed, the modern theory of interest groups, as in 
Grossman and Helpman (2001), argues that interest groups have more clout in less transparent societies. We leave 
the study of the determinants of the efficacy, instead of the existence, of interest groups, for future research.  
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a map of both liberalization and regulatory institutions for some countries. We aim at giving 
more precise and granular measures of both entry barriers and regulator independence. With 
these more descriptive measures, we then perform an analysis of the likely characteristics of a 
country that wants to promote lower entry barriers or more regulatory independence. This 
exercise may be relevant for investors who want to assess the regulatory climate in different 
countries or to policy analysts who want to predict the likely difficulties that reforms may face 
in some jurisdictions. The analysis of the likely determinants of policies has been performed 
before in related areas, for example to study the choice of incentive regulation across U.S. 
states.
9  
The analysis starts by defining the variables that capture telecommunications reform. We focus 
on two policy dimensions: entry barriers and regulatory independence. Both variables are 
themselves multi-dimensional, so the first thing we do is to measure a set of original indicators 
and aggregate them through indices to obtain one variable for entry barriers and one for 
regulatory independence.  
To analyze the determinants of these specific telecommunication policies, we use a simple 
reduced-form model that relates policies to interest groups, economic, institutional and sector 
variables. This specification takes into account the special features of the telecommunications 
sector. When confronted with the decision to open the industry to competition, the entry 
barriers faced by new operators are a decisive factor. Policy makers may use a number of tools 
to favor the entrants. Hence the policy variable, measured with an entry barriers index, will 
describe both the elimination of regulatory barriers to entry, and cases where regulation 
actually favors entry
10 (a higher value in the index will indicate lower entry barriers). A second 
policy variable will capture how independent regulators are from governments (a higher value 
in the index will indicate more independence vis-à-vis the government). In this paper, we make 
no claims about the benefits or otherwise of lower entry barriers or regulator independence in 
terms of any of the variables used. We constrain ourselves at this stage to measuring these 
phenomena and quantifying their likely determinants. 
The specification we use is the following: 
(1)         s = h (Political Institutions, Interest groups,  1 − q …) + u 
where q represents the industry outcomes and s represents the policy variables to be explained. 
h is a function and u is an error term. The set of variables s includes both entry barriers and the 
independence of regulatory institutions. In equation (1) we include lagged industry outcomes to 
take into account the potential causal link between past performance variables and current 
policies. 
With this specification strategy in mind, we test two hypotheses derived from the literature on 
political economy and regulation: 
                                              
9 See Donald and Sappington (1995). 
10 Elimination of regulatory barriers is usually associated with the term “deregulation,” whereas favoring entrants 
through regulation could be called “asymmetric regulation.” Needless to say, liberalization (i.e., allowing 
competition) can be accompanied both by more regulation (rules of access pricing and quality, for example) or by 
deregulation (elimination of previous rules). In this sense, our “entry barriers” index captures both deregulation and 
asymmetric regulation issues. 
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Hypothesis 1) Entry barriers are negatively associated with more interventionist traditions, and 
significantly related to the weight of interest groups and the partisan ideology of the reforming 
government. 
First, policies are typically associated with institutional traditions. Policies that lower entry 
barriers will be more ambitious in countries with a less interventionist tradition (LaPorta et al., 
1999 and 2002), since in these countries laws and institutions are there to enlarge the scope of 
markets and constrain the executive’s powers relative to business. Second, many policies have 
been observed to be partisan, i.e. different political parties, since they represent different 
constituencies, will implement different policies (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995). This is opposed 
to median voter settings, which yield policy platform convergence. Right wing governments, 
according to this “partisan” view, emphasizing free markets more than redistributive policies, 
will be more prone to deregulate and create an environment that is favorable to private 
investment in telecommunications. And third, policies will be influenced by interest groups, 
which compete in the political arena to obtain favorable policies (see Peltzman, 1976, and 
Grossman and Helpman, 2001). 
Hypothesis 2) Setting up independent regulatory agencies is a policy decision itself, which 
depends on the institutional endowment of each country and the interest of dominant interest 
groups in the outcomes of this institutional setting relative to the alternatives. 
The explanatory variables for equation (i) will include a number of institutional indices. These 
political variables influence the choice of policies (market-opening policies as well as regulatory 
institutions). Using this specification, one can test, for example, whether regulatory 
independence is necessary or redundant (and hence socially too expensive) once the country 
has other ways to enforce contracts and credibly commit to stable policies. Levy and Spiller 
(1996) and Henisz and Zelner (2000b) argue that the creation of independent agencies is one 
among several options available to countries that want to commit credibly to not expropriating 
the sunk investments that characterize network industries. Whether this option will be exercised 
or not depends on the institutional endowment and the structure of interest groups. 
Data  
1.  Telecommunications Policy Variables 
We collected data on a number of original variables reflecting telecommunications policies and 
institutions in 1998 for 37 countries. The description and measurement technique of these 
original variables can be found in Appendix 1. We initially aggregated the original variables in 
four indices, two for entry barriers and two for regulatory independence. For the sake of 
completeness, we also computed one more index in each case (used in Tables 4 and 6). These 
aggregation techniques are summarized below and more detail is provided in Appendix 2. The 
values that the indices take for each country and the rankings for each index can be found in 
Appendix 3. The construction of the indices can be easily replicated. Alternatively, the original 
variables can be combined in different ways according to the requirements of other 
researchers.
11  
                                              
11 The data on the observations for the original variables are available upon request.  
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Data have been collected from web pages, legislative texts published by the different regulatory 
authorities, documents and working papers of the OECD and the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), studies carried out on behalf of the European Commission 
and articles from specialized journals.  
The two indices on entry barriers (entry and entry(pc)) aggregate information on the following 
12 measures or indicators: 
•  The degree to which entry in the industry is subject to investment conditions of any 
kind. The more demanding the investment conditions, the more costly it will be for 
new operators to enter the market, and hence the higher the entry barriers in the 
industry. 
•  The average of the number of mobile providers in 1996 and 1997. The number of 
actual entrants in the mobile industry gives a (certainly imperfect) measure of how 
easy it has been to enter the industry in the immediate past. Since mobile telephony 
has been opened to competition prior to (at least local) fixed telephony in many 
countries, it can give information about actual features of the industry not captured by 
formal rules that can influence entry barriers in 1998 for the overall industry. In this 
sense, we treat mobile telephony as part of the telecommunications industry. Entry 
barriers in the mobile sector can give an idea of entry barriers in fixed telephony and 
other areas of the telecommunications industry, because investors and regulators are in 
many cases the same. 
•  The method of spectrum allocation. Market methods of spectrum allocation (e.g. 
auctions) make it easier for new operators to enter the industry and hence are 
associated with lower entry barriers. 
•  The existence of number portability in fixed and mobile telephony (two variables). 
Number portability reduces switching costs and consumer inertia and hence involves 
lower entry barriers for new operators. 
•  The existence of carrier selection and carrier pre-selection in local, long distance and 
international telephony (six variables). Carrier selection or pre-selection also reduces 
switching costs and consumer inertia and hence involves lower entry barriers for new 
operators. 
•  The availability of local loop unbundling. This provision, which has been quite 
controversial in many countries, facilitates the sharing of the incumbents’ 
infrastructure by entrants, thus lowering entry barriers. 
Although more variables could no doubt be added, it is clear that the ones included 
reflect, in practice, the key characteristics of any policy designed to lower entry barriers in 
telecommunications. 
We have associated a metric to each of these variables, with the lowest value for policies that 
are less favorable to ease of entry and a higher value to policies that are more favorable. These 
values have been used to compute two indices, namely entry and entry(pc). The difference 
between entry and entry(pc) is that whereas the former is an ad hoc index that just adds up the 
values of all the “entry barrier” indicators that have been considered, the latter is a weighted 
average of three new intermediate variables that summarize all the information in the original 
indicators using principal components analysis. To compute a unique principal components  
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index of entry barriers (entry(pc), each of the three new variables is weighted
12 by the 
proportion of the variance of the original variables that each of them explains. The correlation 
coefficient between entry and entry(pc) is 0.91. 
In the rankings we provide in the appendix, it can be seen that the indices behave according to 
conventional wisdom, with countries like the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Germany, New Zealand 
and Chile among the countries with lower entry barriers, and countries like India, Ireland and 
Ethiopia among the laggards. 
Of the 37 countries for which we collected information, 33 had a separate regulatory agency in 
operation in 1998 (all except Chile, Japan, New Zealand and Israel). Of these, 18 had set up the 
regulatory agency prior to 1997. In this year, as many as 11 agencies started operating, and 
four of them started in 1998. The oldest agency is the FCC of the U.S., which started operating 
in 1934, and the next one at the national level was not created until 1976 in Canada. All the 
others were created in the 1990s. Therefore, the establishment of separate regulatory agencies is 
a very recent phenomenon. 
The two indices on regulatory independence (indep and indep(pc)) are based on information 
which covers the following 11 indicators: 
•  The degree to which the regulatory agency, as opposed to a ministerial department, is 
competent in the following policies: licensing, interconnection, tariffs, scarce resources 
allocation (such as spectrum frequencies and numeration plans), and universal service 
(five variables). Making final decisions on these policy issues means that these issues 
are more detached from the short term concerns of politicians, and hence it means that 
the regulatory agency is more independent from government. 
•  The degree to which its funding sources are independent of the government’s 
discretion. If its funding does not depend on government decisions, at least in the 
short run, the agency will feel less constrained in its decisions, and hence it will have 
more independence from government. 
•  The rules of appointment of the head of the agency or its board. If the appointment 
can be made by a minister or cabinet member without any constraints on 
qualifications or procedures, we associate it with less independence. If the appointment 
is made by a legislative or other body and/or has to follow specific procedures in terms 
of publicity and qualifications, the regulator will be more independent from 
government. 
•  The length of the term in office for the head of the office or the members of the board. 
If there is some overlap between the period in office of old appointments and new 
governments, the agency will not necessarily share the government’s preferences, or 
the agency head will be less worried about re-appointment for a longer period of time. 
•  The rules about obligations to report to the government, parliament or another official 
body. The less the regulator has to report to the government, the more independent it is. 
                                              
12 A similar technique is used for example in Bandiera et al. (2000).  
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•  The number of years since the establishment of the agency’s effective operation. 
Agencies which that have been in operation for longer periods of time will have a 
reputation of their own and their independence will be more difficult to undermine. 
•  The incumbent’s percentage of private ownership (we also compute two alternative 
indices with principal components, one for entry and one for independence, where the 
privatization indicator is part of the entry index instead of the independence index). 
Arguably, privatization could affect entry policies more than the degree of 
independence of the regulator. However, if the incumbent is not privatized, any 
regulator that is separated from the government will face double pressure, both from 
cabinet ministers and from government officials in the incumbent, and hence he or she 
will find it more difficult to keep his or her independence. 
These original variables reflect mainly legal independence. It is desirable that independence 
indices also reflect independence in practice. This is difficult at this stage given the limited 
experience available with independent or at least separate agencies. However, inclusion of the 
funding variable, the experience of the agency or the privatization variable, move the index as 
close as possible to a practical one at this stage.  
This is a shortcoming of independence measures that has been recognized by other researchers 
who have analyzed regulatory independence,
13 and which the availability of more data based 
on the experience of agencies in their first years of life will correct. Finally, the inclusion in the 
regression analysis of variables capturing overall regulatory quality could make up, at least 
partially, for this shortcoming. 
Edwards and Waverman (2006) provide the only attempt to build a similar index of regulatory 
independence. As compared to their measurement exercise, our index uses more variables and 
has data for more countries (they only analyze EU countries). However, the indices are similar 
in spirit and in our view both show the way forward in terms of moving the literature on 
regulation closer to the degree of detail of the literature on central bank independence. 
We have assigned a metric to each of the indicators of independence, with the lowest value for 
policies that give less independence to the regulatory institution and a higher value to policies 
that give more independence. These values have been aggregated into two indices; indep and 
indep(pc). The difference between indep and indep(pc) is that whereas the former is an ad hoc 
index that just adds up the values in all the “independence” indicators that have been 
considered, the latter is the result of weighting (by the percentage of variance explained) the 
four new intermediate variables that summarize all the observations in these indicators using 
principal components analysis. The correlation coefficient between these two indices is 0.93. 
Principal components analysis is a plausible way to aggregate indicators since it removes the 
effects of variable correlation. That is to say, it aggregates indicators that behave similarly 
across countries and so provides an aggregate index which focuses on those indicators that 
provide more information about the variability in the policy choices of the countries in the 
sample.  
                                              
13 See Stern and Cubbin (2003), and Edwards and Waverman (2006).  
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2.  Telecommunications Performance Variables 
Data on the performance of the telecommunications industry is obtained from the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) database. We focus on performance as measured by network 
penetration and productivity data. 
Network penetration is described as main lines per 100 inhabitants (lines100). We focus on the 
level of this variable in 1998 (lines10098). Productivity is measured as subscribers per 
employee in 1994 (e.g. subsworker94). We keep these two variables in the regressions (we also 
introduced lines10094 and subsworker98 in some specifications that we do not report, with no 
significant results). 
3.  Political and Institutional Variables 
We have collected a number of political variables on the general quality of government, interest 
groups, ideology, institutions and the tradition of each country with regard to the state’s 
involvement in the economy. 
Our ideological variable ideology has a value of one if the largest party in the government was 
a right wing party as of January 1st, 1997, and a value of zero if the largest party had any 
other orientation. We elaborated this variable from Beck et al.’s (2001) original data set.
14  
We have two variables reflecting the interventionist tradition of each country, i.e., the degree to 
which the state has an inclination to intervene in economic matters. Both of them are collected 
from LaPorta’s web page at the Economics Department of Harvard University. One of them, 
legal, reports on whether the country’s legal system is in the English Civil Law tradition, or in 
another more interventionist tradition, such as Socialist, French Common Law, German 
Common Law or Scandinavian Common Law. LaPorta et al. (1999) argue that this variable 
proxies for the degree of interventionism of the state in economic matters, since English Civil 
Law was set up to protect owners from the sovereign, whereas traditions such as French 
Common Law were designed to reinforce the role of the state. The Socialist tradition would be 
an extreme case of interventionism and the other two would be intermediate cases between 
English and French. We give a value of 0 to 4 in the order of most interventionist to less (so the 
order is Socialist, French, German, Scandinavian, English). Moreover, this variable is interesting 
as a potential instrument because it is exogenous and uncorrelated with performance in 
telecommunications, since the legal tradition is usually associated with colonization or 
conquest. The other measure of interventionism, procedures, is the number of steps that a new 
business has to take in order to start operating, and it is obtained from LaPorta et al. (2002). 
We have some variables reflecting the weight of some interest groups in policies of interest, 
although this is clearly an area that can be expanded in future research. We have the number of 
telecommunications workers divided by the overall population (staff) as a measure of the size of the 
                                              
14 The original data set on ideologies by Beck et al. labels the largest party in each country’s government as left, 
center, right or non-applicable. However, the way they allocate the left or center label to different largest parties 
seemed to us a bit inaccurate. For example, they attach the label left both to the Cuban government and to the 
Clinton administration in the US, whereas the Prodi administration in Italy and the center-left ruling coalition in 
Chile are allocated the Center label. The way they allocate the right label seemed to us more clear cut. 
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incumbent, and the percentage of urban population (urbanpop) as a measure of the size of a social 
group demanding new services and hence a priori in favor of telecom liberalization. Both measures 
take the observations for 1994 (staff94 and urbanpop94). As far as the staff variable is concerned, 
our purpose is not to capture the influence of the current workforce on the policies, but instead to 
give a proxy of the clout of the firm as an interest group. In this sense, the size of the company a 
few years before the study may describe the historical and inherited power of the company as a 
lobby. If the incumbent company was very large four years before the year in which it is studied, 
that year it will continue to be a powerful lobby, even if there have been layoffs and changes in the 
workforce, especially as long as the company is still the dominant operator. 
We have three variables reflecting the general quality of government, obtained from Kaufmann 
and Kraay (2002). These are regqual,  goveff and rulelaw, and they are composite indices 
measuring, respectively, the general quality of government, government effectiveness and the 
rule of law. 
And we initially explored one additional variable, instconst, which is an index of institutional 
constraints on executive bodies, first used in Henisz and Zelner (2000). We used the average for 
this index between 1945 and 1975. This index gives a measure of the ability of governments to 
commit themselves or their successors to policies that prevent the expropriation of investments. 
Table 1 reports on the correlation matrix of these institutional and political variables for our 
observations, plus our indep(pc) index. The table clearly shows that these variables measure 
different phenomena, and that not taking some of them into account may lead us to omit some 
important influences in the analysis. The rule of law index, the government effectiveness index 
and the regulatory quality index are highly positively correlated. The legal origin and the number 
of procedures to set up a new business are highly negatively correlated. Surprisingly, our index of 
regulatory independence is not highly correlated with any of the other institutional indices. We 
tackle this issue more in depth below, when we discuss our preliminary results. 
Table 1 
Correlation Between Sector-Specific and General Regulation Variables 
 regqual  indep(pc)  goveff rulelaw  legal instconst  procedures 
regqual  1           
indep(pc)  0.0493    1           
goveff  0.9221    0.0093    1         
rulelaw  0.8743   -0.087    0.9285    1       
legal  0.4439   -0.275  0.4823  0.4963  1     
instconst  0.3558   -0.161  0.4971 0.5447  0.6194 1   
procedures  -0.639   0.0845  -0.648 -0.664  -0.775 -0.6393  1 
 
 
We also have data on the GDP per capita in 1998 in dollar terms (Gdpcap98) to control for the 
level of development in each country, which may also influence telecom performance. There is a 
high correlation between regulatory quality (and also government effectiveness and rule of law) 
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Figure 1 













Econometric Results of the Determinants of Endogenous Policies  
In Tables 3 and 4 we show the estimates for the determinants of entry barriers for two alternative 
specifications. Among the variables initially explored, we do not use the procedures measure, the 
Henisz index, and the government effectiveness index, because given the relatively low number 
of observations, we find it more valuable to focus on a low number of institutional variables and 
the ones discarded in this exercise did not yield significant results in any specification and/or 
were highly correlated with other variables. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the 
explanatory variables used in the regressions: 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable |  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
legal |                    37 2.108108  1.349563  0  4 
iddummy |             37  0.3243243       0.474579          0 1 
gdpcap98 |            37  16429.59      12443.89          106.0387          42730.66 
regqual |                37  0.7502703      0.5706063          -0.71          1.82 
rulelaw |                 37   0.9137838      0.8469499          -0.82         2 
subsworker94 |      37  168.5808      74.31412          12.06927        294.625 
lines10098 |           37  38.33343      23.86969          0.27518          72.157 
staff94 |                 37  0.1956929      0.1152364          0.0097726          0.3859936 




12 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
In Table 3, where the principal components index of entry barriers does not include the percentage 
of private ownership of the incumbent, legal origins and lagged performance appear to be 
significant and positive determinants of the index in some of the specifications. These effects 
maintain their magnitude and sign as we add other explanatory variables although they tend to lose 
significance.
15 Our estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that less interventionist societies 
tend to have lower entry barriers to a larger extent, and impose regulations that favor the 
incumbents to a lesser degree. Societies with better telecommunications services also tend to lower 
barriers to a larger extent, although this is a weaker result in terms of robustness. The ideology of 
reforming governments appears to have no impact on the decision to lower barriers. 
Telecommunications entry does not appear to be a partisan policy. This would not be incompatible 
with some aspects of the reform process being partisan, but overall, reform in the sense of favoring 
entry through a variety of dimensions is not partisan according to our data. Adding the variable 
GDP per capita to the regressors does not change the results nor is it significant in itself, so we 
conclude that entry barriers are unrelated to the country’s level of development. 
  
Table 3 
Parameter Estimates of Entry Barriers (OLS) 
Dependent Variable: entry(pc)  Explanatory  
Variables  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
legal  0.091* (1.73)  0.091* (1.70)  0.07    (1.24)  0.077   (1.14) 
ideology  -0.05    (-0.33)  -0.06   (0.38)  -0.044  (-0.27)  -0.014  (-0.08) 
gdpcap98      0.001    (0.10)  -0.001  (-1.04) 
regqual        0.319    (1.18) 
rulelaw        -0.163   (-0.72) 
subsworker94  0.002**  (2.08)  0.001  (1.36)  0.001    (0.61)  0.000     (0.0) 
lines10098      0.001    (1.07)  0.02       (0.99) 
staff94       -1.161    (-0.52) 
urbanpop    0.001     (0.22)    -0.001  (-0.20) 











VIF (mean)  1.04  1.56  4.58  9.94 
R square  0.21  0.21  0.24  0.28 
Adjusted R square  0.13  0.11  0.08  0.04 
 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, unless otherwise indicated; significance at 10% level: *; significance at 5% level: **; significance at 1% 
level: ***. The White test is a standard test statistic under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. VIF (mean) reports the mean of the 
variance inflation factors. The number of observations in all regressions is 37. 
                                              
15 In Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6, we report, for each regression, the results of the White test for heteroskedasticity, and the 
mean of the variance inflation factor (VIF) as a measure of multicolinearity. A VIF value lower than ten, is taken, as 
a practical rule, as descriptive of an absence of multicolinearity (see for example Gujarati, 1997). All figures are 
within reasonable values, so we cannot reject the hypotheses of homoskedasticity and absence of multicolinearity. 
We performed basic tests of serial correlation, which we do not report, without any significant result. These basic 
tests, such as Durbin-Watson, require the specification of a specific pattern. Serial correlation in a cross section may 
be due to spatial patterns, omitted variables or incorrect functional form, but it is less frequent than in time series. 
Since our results are already robust to several excluded and included variables, and in any case given our low 
number of observations, we have tried to keep the number of variables at a low level.  
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In Table 4, the entry index includes the percentage of private ownership. This reinforces the 
impact of legal origin as a determinant of entry barriers, since now the legal origin variable is 
statistically significant in all specifications. This reflects the fact that countries that have a less 
interventionist judicial tradition are more prone to open up their telecommunications sectors, 
including selling a large share, and possibly all of it, to the private sector. The ideology 
variable, however, again has no significant impact on entry barriers, even when we measure 
this including privatization. 
As we saw in Table 1, our index of regulatory independence is not highly correlated with any 
of the other institutional indices, and in particular it is not correlated with overall regulatory 
quality. We interpret this as evidence that formal regulatory independence is compatible with 
different levels of general regulatory or institutional quality. However, this does not mean that 
regulatory independence does not show any systematic pattern. 
 
Table 4 
Parameter Estimates of Entry Barriers Including Privatization (OLS) 
Dependent Variable: entry/p(pc)  Explanatory  
Variables  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
legal  0.11**     (2.64)  0.11**      (2.60)  0.11**   (2.35)  0.11** (2.24) 
ideology  -0.06       (-0.52)  -0.08       (-0.67)  -0.06   (-0.52)  -0.05 (-0.41) 
gdpcap98      -0.01  (-1.20)  -0.01  (-1.32) 
regqual        0.27   (1.32) 
rulelaw       -0.17  (-1.00) 
subsworker94  0.002**      (2.18)  0.001    (1.20)  0.001     (1.40)  0.001   (0.10) 
lines10098      0.01     (0.89)  0.02   (1.18) 
staff94       -1.38  (-0.81) 
urbanpop    0.01   (0.57)    0.01    (0.02) 
intercept  -0.48***  (-3.21)  -0.56**   (-2.68)  -0.53*** 
(-3.21) 











VIF (mean)  1.04  1.56  4.58  9.94 
R square  0.30  0.30  0.33  0.38 
Adjusted R square  0.23  0.22  0.22  0.18 
 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; significance at 10% level: *; significance at 5% level: **; significance at 1% level: ***. The White test is 
a standard test statistic under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. VIF (mean) reports the mean of the variance inflation factors. The 
number of observations in all regressions is 37. 
 
Our regression results on the determinants of independence (see Tables 5 and 6) show that 
independence is a substitute for other ways of achieving commitment not to expropriate. In 
particular, the respect for the rule of law
16 (which has a negative sign and is significant in the 
four specifications we report both in Table 5, where the independence index includes 
                                              
16 We report regression results using the principal components indices. The qualitative interpretation, sign and 
significance of results are unchanged if we instead use the indices computed adding up the original variables.  
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privatization, and in Table 6, where the independence index does not include privatization) and 
the presence of right wing pro-capital governments (which has a negative sign in the four 
specifications and is significant in three of them both in Table 5 and in Table 6) appear to be 
negatively and in most cases significantly related to the creation of independent regulatory 
agencies. This is consistent with the Levy and Spiller (1996) view of regulatory commitment 
and credibility. Countries achieve regulatory commitment not to expropriate investment, 
yielding good results in terms of industry performance, if they are able to create credible 
institutions that are well adapted to the institutional endowment of each country. Since 
institutional endowments vary across countries, the way different countries set up commitment 
institutions (through legislation, contracts or independent regulation) will vary.
17  
In Chile, for example, with a presidential system and coalition governments, it is very difficult 
to change legislation, so that commitment is achieved through very detailed laws which, as 
anticipated at the time of reform, would make setting up a regulatory independent agency 
redundant and hence not cost effective if there is any cost to independence (for example in 
terms of political legitimacy or other costs to the political principals). Hence Chile is one of the 
few countries in our data set that does not even have a separate telecom regulator. 
In some of our regressions (significantly in two of the four specifications both in Table 5 and in 
Table 6, and with a positive sign in three of the specifications in Table 4 and in all in Table 6), 
the effect of the size of the incumbent (as measured by the number of telecommunications staff 
some years before the year in which independence is measured, namely in 1994) has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the decision to create an independent regulatory agency.  
This is a surprising result, and we could interpret it as the incumbent preferring an independent 
regulator in the face of the forthcoming liberalization, which will inevitably be associated with 
more interest group competition. This is consistent with the view of Henisz and Zelner (2000) 
on the electricity industry, where they show that incumbents lobby for the creation of 
constraints on investment expropriation if they foresee strong interest group competition. 
Adding the variable GDP per capita among the regressors does not change the results nor is it 
significant in itself, so we conclude that setting up legally independent regulatory agencies is 
unrelated to the level of development. 
                                              
17 The U.K. set up independent regulators with a right wing government and high quality rule of law. However, in 
many ways it is a special case. With its centralized system and first-pass-the-post electoral system, it has very few 
constraints on the executive’s behaviour, so that new and special institutions, such as an independent regulator, 
must be put in place to achieve commitment. The way the independent regulator is set up takes advantage of other 
features of the British institutional endowment, such as the respect for contracts and the independence of the 
judiciary. See Vogelsang and Spiller (1997).  
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Table 5 
Estimates of Regulatory Independence Including Privatization (OLS) 
Dependent Variable: indep/p(pc)  Explanatory  
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
legal      -0.064    (-1.17) 
ideology  -0.219*  (-1.71)  -0.235*  (-1.83)  -0.231* (-1.82)  -0.202  (-1.46) 
gdpcap98      0.001 (0.77)  0.001    (0.06) 
regqual    0.247     (1.28)  0.254 (1.32)  0.352    (1.61) 
rulelaw  -0.205* (-2.00)  -0.402** (-2.45)  -0.398** (-2.50)  -0.381** (-2.10) 
subsworker94      -0.004    (-1.69) 
lines10098    0.005     (0.71)    0.019   (1.20) 
staff94  1.954** (2.58)  1.30      (1.16)  1.61* (1.93)  -0.231  (-0.13) 
urbanpop      0.002      (0.39) 











VIF  (mean)  1.72 4.51 3.12 9.94 
R  square  0.22 0.28 0.28  0.3807 
Adjusted  R  square  0.16 0.17 0.17  0.1743 
   
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; significance at 10% level: *; significance at 5% level: **; significance at 1% level: ***. The White test is 
a standard test statistic under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. VIF (mean) reports the mean of the variance inflation factors. The 
number of observations in all regressions is 37.  
 
Table 6 
Parameter Estimates of Regulatory Independence (OLS) 
Dependent Variable: indep(pc)  Explanatory  
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
legal        -0.11*   (-1.90) 
ideology  -0.27*   (-1.86)  -0.27* (-1.89)  -0.28*  (-1.96)  -0.22    (-1.49) 
gdpcap98      0.01    (0.71)  0.01      (0.51) 
regqual    0.30      (1.36)  0.29   (1.36)  0.45*     (1.91) 
rulelaw  -0.21*  (-1.85)  -0.40**  (-2.15)  -0.43**   (-2.40)  -0.36*   (-1.84) 
subsworker94        -0.01*   (-1.91) 
lines10098    0.01  (0.24)    0.01      (0.82) 
staff94  2.07**    (2.43)  1.76  (1.39)  1.70*   (1.81)  0.39      (0.20) 
urbanpop        0.01      (0.33) 











VIF  (mean)  1.72 4.51 3.12 9.94 
R  square  0.2213  0.27 0.28 0.30 
Adjusted  R  square  0.1506  0.15 0.16 0.23 
 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; significance at 10% level: *; significance at 5% level: **; significance at 1% level: ***. The White test is 
a standard test statistic under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. VIF (mean) reports the mean of the variance inflation factors. The 
number of observations in all regressions is 37.  
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To sum up, the data do not reject the part of hypothesis 1 that predicts that entry barriers are 
related to the non-interventionist tradition of countries, or the part of hypothesis 2 that predicts 
that regulatory independence is determined by the institutional endowment of countries. We 
also find (weaker) support for the part of hypothesis 2 that predicts that independence is 
associated with interest group pressure. In this case, we find that countries with a larger 
incumbent are more prone to create independent agencies, although this result is not 
statistically as strong as the previous one. We conjecture that large incumbents may find that 
independent specialized regulators (with staff members probably recruited among previous 
incumbent staff) may be more easily captured than governments, and/or that large incumbents 
may have more to lose without an independent regulator, if the independent regulator, as a 
credible commitment device, contributes to alleviating the under-investment problem. This is so 
because larger incumbents have larger sunk investments in infrastructures. Larger data-sets 
with a longer time horizon will confirm, or not, this conjecture. 
Regulatory quality has a positive impact on independence, although this is significant in only 
one of the specifications. If additional data confirms this result, we could interpret the evidence 
as telling us that, among those countries that have low ability to commit through other means, 
those with better regulatory quality will at least be able to create sustainable independent 
regulatory agencies. 
The correlation coefficient between the principal components index of independence with the 
original privatization variable (the one used in Table 5) and the one without this original 
variable (the one in Table 6) is 0.9625. 
The correlation coefficient between the principal components index of entry without the 
original privatization variable (which we used in Table 3) and the one with this original 
variable (which we used in Table 4) is 0.9613. Hence there does not seem to be a big difference 
between including privatization in the entry barriers dimension and including it in the 
independence dimension. 
It is easy to find arguments as to why privatization should be either part of independence or of 
entry barriers. One can include it in the package of independence policies if one thinks that 
private ownership of the incumbent further separates the government from the operators it is to 
regulate. Or one can include it in the entry barriers package if one thinks that opening up the 
capital of the incumbent to private ownership is part of the policy to stop a tradition of 
favoring incumbents using public policy.   
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Conclusions 
In this study, we provide a new data set that allows us to measure telecommunications reforms 
carefully and rank countries according to their policies, and we clarify in statistical terms which 
are the likely determinants of the creation of independent agencies and the determinants of 
entry barriers.
18 Our main conclusions about these issues can be summarized as follows: 
1) Measurement and rankings. We present new data, in the form of several indices, on entry 
policies and the independence of regulators for a cross section of countries. These indices take 
into account the multi-dimensionality of policies and institutions. In the case of independence, 
this moves the empirical literature on regulation one step closer to the empirical literature on 
central bank independence in monetary policy, where the use of independence indices as 
opposed to dummy variables has become common practice. 
2) Political and institutional determinants. Policies are endogenous. Our indices were 
combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to quantify 
the determinants of telecommunications policies. We found that entry barriers are positively 
associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the 
partisan ideology of reforming governments. We also found that countries with weak protection 
of the investors’ quasi-rents by other means, and countries with a larger incumbent, are more 
prone to create independent regulatory agencies, although the latter is a statistically weaker 
result. The effect of the institutional endowment is consistent with the previous literature 
on regulatory institutions. The positive association between incumbent size and independent 
regulators may seem puzzling. We conjecture that large incumbents may find that independent 
specialized regulators (with staff members probably recruited among previous incumbent staff) 
may be more easily captured than governments, and/or that large incumbents may have more 
to lose without an independent regulator, if the independent regulator contributes to alleviating 
the under-investment problem. This is the case because larger incumbents have larger sunk 
investments in infrastructures. 
Future research should focus on the impact in practice of effective regulatory agencies. Gutiérrez 
(2003) takes a first step in this direction. Despite the importance of creating politically sustainable 
regulatory systems, the establishment of separate regulatory agencies in telecommunications is 
still a very recent phenomenon, and it deserves further scrutiny.  
 
                                              
18 In a previous extended version of this article (see Gual and Trillas, 2004) we also explored the statistical impact of 
independence and entry on network penetration and partial productivity indicators. However, the results in this 
respect were weak. We argued there that, if the endogeneity of policies is not taken into account, misleading results 
may be obtained (along the lines of Duso and Röller, 2003, and Besley and Case, 2000). It is probably too early to 
reach any final conclusion on the effects of different market opening and regulatory independence policies. The 
initial results with this data set point to a positive effect of entry policies on network penetration and a negative 
effect of regulatory independence on productivity, although the results are not always robust. More observations and 
better performance data will be needed to make progress in the overall assessment. As Stern and Cubbin (2003) 
argue: “Given the time needed to establish the effective working of regulatory institutions – let alone the time 
needed to establish their reputation and credibility – it is hardly surprising that, as yet, it has been difficult to make 
any robust estimates of the impact of regulation on outcomes.”  
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Appendix 1 
Original Policy Variables. Definition and Measurement
19 
Investment conditions imposed on entrants: equals 0 if entry to the industry is subjected to 
investment conditions of any kind and 1 otherwise. If there are no entrants, the value is set at 0. 
Average number of mobile providers: average of the number of providers in operation in 1996 
and 1997. 
Number portability. Fixed telephony: equals 0 if number portability in fixed telephony is not 
possible and 1 otherwise. 
Carrier selection. Local: equals 0 if carrier selection of the local operator is not possible and 1 
otherwise. 
Carrier selection. Long distance and international: equals 0 if the carrier selection of the long 
distance operator (national and international) is not possible and 1 otherwise. 
Carrier pre-selection. Local: equals 0 if carrier pre-selection of the local operator is not possible 
and 1 otherwise. 
Carrier pre-selection. Long distance and international: equals 0 if carrier pre-selection of the 
long distance operator (national and international) is not possible and 1 otherwise. 
Year of establishment of effective operation: equals 0 if the regulatory authority is a department 
of the government and grows with older year of establishment. 
Private ownership of the incumbent (%): percentage of the incumbent that is not owned directly 
by the government. 
Local loop unbundling availability: equals 0 if local loop unbundling is not available and 1 
otherwise. 
Method of spectrum allocation: equals 0 if the mobile industry is under monopoly, 1 if the 
licensing process is on a “first come first served” basis, 2 if the spectrum allocation is done 
through comparative tenders, 3 if it is done through competitive tenders with a financial offer, 
and 4 if it is done through auctions. 
Licensing: equals 1 if the regulator has the power to grant licenses and 0 if it is a function 
carried out only by a ministry. If the ministry is the only regulator, this variable is set to 0 as 
well. 
Interconnection: equals 1 if the regulator has the power to establish and administrate 
interconnection regimes and 0 in the same situations as in the previous variable. 
Tariffs: equals 1 if the regulator can determine regulated tariffs and 0 in the same situations as 
the previous variable. 
Scarce resources: equals 1 if the regulator can administrate scarce resources, such as spectrum 
frequencies and numeration plans, and 0 in the same situations as before. 
                                              
19 Unless otherwise stated, the measurement refers to the situation at the beginning of 1998. The original data on 
which the indices are based is available upon request.   
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
 
Universal service: equals 1 if the regulator can establish and administrate a universal service 
and 0 in the same situations as before. 
Funding: equals 0 if the regulator gets its funds from the government budget, 1 if it also gets 
fees from the operators and 2 if the funding is only through fees paid by the operators. 
Appointed by: equals 0 if the head of the regulatory authority is appointed directly by the 
government, 1 if he/she is appointed by the government and the legislature and 2 if he/she is 
appointed only by the legislature. If the regulatory authority is a department of the government, 
it takes a value of 0. 
Length of term: years of the term in office for the regulator. If the regulatory authority is a 
department of the government or its term is not defined, the value is set to 0. 
Reporting to: equals 0 if the regulatory authority has to report to the government, 1 if it has to 
report to the government and to the legislature, 2 if it has to report only to the legislature and 3 
if it reports to no one. 
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Appendix 2 
Construction of Indices  
A2.1. Entry and indep 
The entry and indep indices each use a number of original variables in the following way: First, 
the original variables are re-coded, so that each of the observations can be measured on a 0-1 
range. This is done by dividing the original metric for each observation by the maximum value 
of the variable (for example, if Spain has a value of 2 in “method of spectrum allocation” the 
re-coded value will be 2/4=0.5, where 4 is the maximum value that this original variable takes). 
Then the values of all the re-coded original variables used for the index are added for each 
country. Hence the final index will have a maximum value equal to the number of original 
variables used in its computation. 
Entry uses as original variables: investment conditions imposed on entrants, average number of 
mobile providers, method of spectrum allocation, number portability (fixed telephony), number 
portability (mobile telephony), carrier selection (local), carrier selection (long distance and 
international), carrier pre-selection (local), carrier pre-selection (long distance and international), 
local loop unbundling. 
Indep uses as original variables: licensing, interconnection, tariffs, scarce resources, universal 
service, funding, appointed by, term, reporting to, year of establishment of effective operation, 
private ownership of incumbent. 
A 2.2 Indep(pc) and entry(pc) 
These indices are computed using the principal components methodology. The original variables 
for each index are used to find the linear combinations that minimize the overall variance. 
Indep(pc)  uses as original variables: licensing, interconnection, tariffs, scarce resources, 
universal service, funding, appointed by, length of term, reporting to, year of establishment of 
effective operation, private ownership of the incumbent. 
Entry(pc) uses as original variables: investment conditions imposed on entrants, average 
number of mobile providers, number portability (fixed telephony), carrier selection (local), 
carrier selection (long distance and international), carrier pre-selection (local), carrier pre-
selection (long distance and international), local loop unbundling availability. 
Principal components indices are obtained in both cases as follows. We describe the total 
variance of a set of n points (the original variables) in p dimensional space by introducing a 
new set of p orthogonal and uncorrelated variates (the new indices). The new set is formed by 
taking normalized linear combinations of the original set so that the rth variate generated has 
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The following tables show the numerical results for the computation of principal components, 
first for the set of “independence” variables, and second for the set of “entry barriers” variables. 
As it can be seen, for the independence components, the four first components explain 70% of 
the variance. For the entry components, the three first components suffice to explain the same 
proportion of variance.
20 This proportion is deemed sufficient in the principal components 
literature to retain the components that explain it. 
Table A1 
Total Variance Explained by Independence Components 
Total Variance Explained 
  Initial Eigenvalues  Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings  Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 












1 3.675 33.408  33.408  3.675  33.408  33.408  2.466  22.419  22.419 
2 1.483 13.481  46.889  1.483  13.481  46.889  2.007  18.247  40.667 
3 1.337 12.154  59.043  1.337  12.154  59.043  1.767  16.065  56.732 
4 1.160 10.548  69.591  1.160  10.548  69.591  1.415  12.859  69.591 
5 0.987  8.971  78.563             
6 0.677  6.153  84.716             
7 0.531  4.828  89.544             
8 0.389  3.536  93.079             
9 0.316  2.870  94.950             
10 0.246  2.234  98.184             
11 0.200  1.816  100.000             
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table A2 
Total Variance Explained by Entry Components 
Total Variance Explained 
  Initial Eigenvalues  Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings  Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Component Total  % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
%  Total  % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 




1 3.562  39.583  39.583  3.562  39.583  39.583  2.240  24.884  24.884 
2 1.440  16.001  55.584  1.440  16.001  55.584  2.076  23.070  467.954 
3 1.373  15.252  70.836  1.373  15.252  70.836  2.059  22.883  70.836 
4 0.754  8.380  79.217             
5 0.597  6.630  84.846             
6 0.496  5.507  91.354             
7 0.396  4.399  95.753             
8 0.250  2.782  98.535             
9 0.132  1.465  100.000             
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
                                              
20 Communalities, which measure the explanatory power of the original variables for the new components, and the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin measure of sampling adequacy recommended dropping the following original variables before 
performing the principal components calculations for the entry variables: method of spectrum allocation, wireless 
local access licensing, number portability (mobile) and tariff rebalancing.  
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Country indep Country indep(pc) Country entry Country entry(pc)
U.S.A. 9.381 0.6681662 7.943 1.251928
Canada 9.314285 0.5222394 6.547812 1.179448
Denmark 8.038095 0.4021606 5.591839 1.084524
Brazil 7.847619 0.3319355 4.896239 1.001984
Jordan 7.838095 0.3243424 4.813 0.5662228
Portugal 7.778572 0.2909521 4.647 0.385118
Germany 7.670952 0.25991 4.558996 0.2778323
Venezuela 7.538095 0.2591524 4.292 0.1531013
Philippines 7.438095 0.2408735 3.803307 0.1205352
Ireland 7.333333 0.2373097 3.581 0.0938418
South Africa 7.314286 0.2330583 2.477045 0.0354726
Singapore 7.081429 0.2318539 2.472739 -0.0068631
Madagascar 6.627762 0.2206925 2.4 -0.073858
U.K. 6.514 0.2159522 2.397585 -0.1175417
Norway 6.304762 0.2069955 2.348204 -0.1308754
Netherlands 6.266762 0.184624 2 -0.1309136
Sweden 6.257 0.1844051 1.857371 -0.1420536
Italy 5.85 0.144458 1.572 -0.1971367
Spain 5.848 0.1413332 1.384 -0.2011951
Belgium 5.680476 0.1392962 1.349943 -0.2023769
Ethiopia (23) 5.570875 0.050338 1.33373 -0.2082356
Austria 5.514286 0.0473781 1.237318 -0.2127706
Switzerland 5.471428 0.0279205 1.237042 -0.2272351
Bulgaria 5.066667 0.0044768 1.127565 -0.2281469
Finland 4.450095 -0.0499222 0.8342639 -0.2677259
Peru 4.404762 -0.0749068 0.5878 -0.2789819
Argentina 4.247619 -0.0872493 0.5067352 -0.3011301
France 4.204 -0.1166388 0.4902169 -0.3041749
Australia 4.177619 -0.2003275 0.4847195 -0.3055564
Morocco 3.780952 -0.2034559 0.4747302 -0.3101694
Mexico 3.751429 -0.2691715 0.4628223 -0.3183601
Luxembourg 3.561905 -0.4477748 0.4505909 -0.321432
N. Zealand 1 -0.7238952 0.4413747 -0.3243261
Chile 1 -0.8243123 0.3599385 -0.3247177
India 0.5619048 -0.8243123 0.3390125 -0.3321502

















































































































Country indep Country indep(pc) Country entry Country entry(pc)
U.S.A. 9.381 0.6681662 7.943 1.251928
Canada 9.314285 0.5222394 6.547812 1.179448
Denmark 8.038095 0.4021606 5.591839 1.084524
Brazil 7.847619 0.3319355 4.896239 1.001984
Jordan 7.838095 0.3243424 4.813 0.5662228
Portugal 7.778572 0.2909521 4.647 0.385118
Germany 7.670952 0.25991 4.558996 0.2778323
Venezuela 7.538095 0.2591524 4.292 0.1531013
Philippines 7.438095 0.2408735 3.803307 0.1205352
Ireland 7.333333 0.2373097 3.581 0.0938418
South Africa 7.314286 0.2330583 2.477045 0.0354726
Singapore 7.081429 0.2318539 2.472739 -0.0068631
Madagascar 6.627762 0.2206925 2.4 -0.073858
U.K. 6.514 0.2159522 2.397585 -0.1175417
Norway 6.304762 0.2069955 2.348204 -0.1308754
Netherlands 6.266762 0.184624 2 -0.1309136
Sweden 6.257 0.1844051 1.857371 -0.1420536
Italy 5.85 0.144458 1.572 -0.1971367
Spain 5.848 0.1413332 1.384 -0.2011951
Belgium 5.680476 0.1392962 1.349943 -0.2023769
Ethiopia (23) 5.570875 0.050338 1.33373 -0.2082356
Austria 5.514286 0.0473781 1.237318 -0.2127706
Switzerland 5.471428 0.0279205 1.237042 -0.2272351
Bulgaria 5.066667 0.0044768 1.127565 -0.2281469
Finland 4.450095 -0.0499222 0.8342639 -0.2677259
Peru 4.404762 -0.0749068 0.5878 -0.2789819
Argentina 4.247619 -0.0872493 0.5067352 -0.3011301
France 4.204 -0.1166388 0.4902169 -0.3041749
Australia 4.177619 -0.2003275 0.4847195 -0.3055564
Morocco 3.780952 -0.2034559 0.4747302 -0.3101694
Mexico 3.751429 -0.2691715 0.4628223 -0.3183601
Luxembourg 3.561905 -0.4477748 0.4505909 -0.321432
N. Zealand 1 -0.7238952 0.4413747 -0.3243261
Chile 1 -0.8243123 0.3599385 -0.3247177
India 0.5619048 -0.8243123 0.3390125 -0.3321502
Israel 0.46 -0.8693424 0.3361807 -0.3359389
Japan 0.35
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